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So You Want to Invest in Russia? A Legislative
Analysis of the Foreign Investment Climate
in Russia
David F. Black
Even at the height of the cold war, a foreign business pres-
ence existed in Russia. Only recently, however, has the Russian
government begun actively soliciting foreign investment. This
change in policy coincided with Russia's attempt to create a
market economy after the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (Soviet Union).' Russia needs foreign capital and
technology to become a free-market economy. An increase in
foreign investment would bring the Western technology, prod-
ucts, and know-how necessary to expedite this transformation.
Foreign companies that can provide capital are tempted by the
possibilities that investment in Russia offers. Foreign investors
are drawn to the virtually untapped market of the former Soviet
Union, a vast wealth of raw materials, and a cheap yet highly
educated work force.
Despite these incentives, foreigners hesitate to invest in
Russia because of uncertainties regarding the economy and bar-
riers to profitable investment. The Russian government has re-
sponded by promoting its nation as a stable foreign investment.2
Russia asserts that its political environment is now stable, that
the economy is recovering, and that there are institutionalized
1. William G. Frenkel & Michael Y. Sukhman, New Foreign Investment
Regimes of Russia and other Republics of the Former U.S.S.R.: A Legislative
Analysis and Historical Perspective, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321, at 323
(1993).
2. President Yeltsin has taken an active role in encouraging foreign in-
vestment in Russia. Increased trade relations and the economic status of Rus-
sia have become major foreign policy issues in discussions between Russia and
the United States. For example, during the September 1994 summit meeting
between the two countries, President Yeltsin took advantage of the opportunity
to sell Russia to potential foreign investors. Alessandra Stanley, On U.S. Visit,
Yeltsin Looks For Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, § 1, at 9.
123
1M Aw. J GLOBAL TRADE
incentives for foreigners to invest.3 Giving credence to these as-
sertions, Russia has hurriedly enacted legislation to attract for-
eign investors.
This Note analyzes the effects that existing legislation has
on the foreign investment climate in Russia. Part I outlines the
history of foreign investment in Russia. Part H discusses new
Russian law created to alleviate fears about investing in Russia.
Part III outlines various international agreements and organi-
zations created to attract foreign investment. Part IV analyzes
common obstacles to investment in Russia and legislative efforts
to overcome these obstacles. This Note concludes that although
Russian legislation designed to attract foreign investment is en-
couraging in form, in practice it is ineffective in creating a stable
investment climate.
I. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO ATTRACT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT INTO RUSSIA
During the existence of the Soviet Union, foreign invest-
ment in the economy was almost entirely forbidden.4 The Com-
munist regime considered foreign capital to be inconsistent with
the basic principles of a socialist economy.5 As a result, eco-
nomic contact with the Soviet Union existed primarily as a lim-
ited trade in goods.6 A foreign company could establish a
presence in the Soviet Union only through a representative
office. 7
In its final years the Soviet Union turned its failing econ-
omy toward capitalism. On March 15, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev
introduced perestroika.8 A key goal of perestroika was to remove
3. Id.
4. See Frenkel & Sukhman, supra note 1, at 321 (discussing barriers to
investment).
5. Mark David Davis & Robert J. Sokota, The Development of the Foreign
Investment Environment in the Russian Federation, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
475 (1992). The basic principals of a socialist economy are central planning and
regulation, concentration of all productive assets in the state and disapproval of
foreign economic entanglements. Foreign investment is often viewed as contra-
dictory to these principals. Id.
6. Trade was limited by mutual distrust, disproportionate risk, export
controls and lack of interest in finished Russian goods on the part of Western
traders, even though they had a continuing interest in gold, oil, and raw materi-
als. Id. at 477.
7. Id. Since these representative offices could not engage in production,
provide services, or carry out other operations in the Soviet Union, the threat of
capitalist intervention was slight. Id.
8. Perestroika consisted of three integrated parts: glasnost (openness),
demokratizatsiia (democratization of the political process), and uskorenie (accel-
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the legal impediments to foreign investment in the Soviet
Union. Initially, this goal included no specific legislation, but
merely invited foreign investors to participate in the economic
development of the Soviet Union under existing Soviet law.9
The Soviet Union took no affirmative steps to convince foreign
investors that it was a stable business environment. Not sur-
prisingly, this policy had little success in bringing foreign capital
into the country.
In 1987, the Soviet government enacted a more detailed law
known as the Joint Venture Law.' 0 This law permitted, and
even encouraged, foreign investment in the production and ser-
vice enterprises of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the law still
contained significant limitations on foreign investment. For ex-
ample, the law prohibited foreign investors from holding more
than fifty percent of a venture,"' required a majority of manage-
ment to be Soviet citizens and required both the chairperson of
the board and the director general to be citizens of the Soviet
Union.1 2 Furthermore, the law required the joint venture to ob-
tain approval from the Council of Ministers of the Soviet
Union.' 3 It also mandated that the Soviet joint venture partner
be a government agency or be connected to an agency and acting
with its permission.' 4
Because these limitations inhibited foreign investment, the
Council of Ministers issued additional edicts which made it more
lucrative for foreign investors to start joint ventures. The edicts
eliminated the restriction preventing foreign investors from
holding more than fifty percent ownership in a joint venture.' 5
In addition, the edicts allowed foreign investors to exercise man-
eration of the pace of economic development). Christopher Osakwe, The Host
Country Perspective on Foreign Investments in the Soviet Union: Law and Pol-
icy, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 207, 209 (1991).
9. Id. at 210.
10. On the Procedure for the Creation on the Territory of the USSR and the
Activities of Joint Enterprises with the Participation of Soviet Organizations
and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries, translated in 26 I.L.M. 749
(1987) [hereinafter Joint Venture Law].
11. Joint Venture Law, supra note 10, § II, art. 5.
12. Joint Venture Law, supra note 10, § Il, art. 21.
13. Joint Venture Law, supra note 10, § I, art. 1.
14. Joint Venture Law, supra note 10, § II.
15. On the Procedure for the Creation on the Territory of the USSR and the
Activities of Joint Enterprises with the Participation of Soviet Organizations
and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries, as amended by Edict No. 352
of Mar. 17, 1988, translated in 29 I.L.M. 263 (1990).
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agerial and executive control over joint ventures. 16 Finally, in
1990, the Soviet government permitted wholly-owned foreign
subsidiaries to do business in Russia. 17
In 1991, almost 3500 joint ventures were registered in the
Soviet Union. Less than ten percent of the ventures were actu-
ally operating,' 8 and the amount of foreign investment in each
venture averaged less than $115,000 (U.S.). 19 These figures fell
far short of the $30-$50 billion worth of foreign investment ex-
pected annually.20 It became obvious that new laws were
needed to attract foreign investment to the Soviet Union.
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS TO
ENCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. THE LAw ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
After the demise of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy
was a disaster. 2' Russian leaders looked to the West for aid.
Russia sought to attract foreign capital, technology, managerial
techniques and jobs. 22 To do this, Russia enacted the Law on
Foreign Investment (Investment Law), which established formal
guidelines for foreign investment. 23 The Investment Law con-
tains numerous provisions reducing the risk of investing in Rus-
sia. The law guarantees foreign investors the same property
and investment rights available to citizens of Russia.2 4 It pre-
cludes discriminatory legislation, and protects foreign invest-
ment from nationalization. Foreign investments may be
16. On the Procedure for the Creation on the Territory of the USSR and the
Activities of Joint Enterprises with the Participation of Soviet Organizations
and Firms of Capitalist and Developing Countries, as amended by Edict No. 385
of May 6, 1989, translated in 29 I.L.M. 263 (1990).
17. Davis & Sokota, supra note 5, at 479.
18. Richard N. Dean, Considering Business Opportunities in the Soviet
Union in the 1990's, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 334 (1991).
19. Id.
20. Economic Ministry on Foreign Investment Needs, Oct. 8, 1993,
F.B.I.S.-Sov. 93-196, at 68 (Oct. 13, 1993).
21. See generally Frenkel & Sukhman, supra note 1.
22. See Memorandum from the Subcommittee on Investment of the Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce in Moscow, Major Issues Affecting Investment In
Russia 8 (Mar. 8, 1994) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade)
[hereinafter Chamber of Commerce memo].
23. Russian Federation Law on Foreign Investments of July 4, 1991,
PARKER SCH. FoREIGN & COMP. L. LEGAL MATERIALs-RussIA AND THE REPUB-
LICS (Foreign Investment section) (1995) [hereinafter Russian Foreign Invest-
ment Law].
24. Id. at ch. II, art. 6. This provision continues to recognize exceptions
which are contained within the Law of Foreign Investments itself.
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requisitioned or confiscated only under "extraordinary circum-
stances in the interest of society."25 In the event of requisition, a
foreign investor is entitled to timely, adequate and sufficient
compensation. 26 The Supreme Soviet of Russia has authority to
make decisions on issues of nationalization. 27 Decisions by ad-
ministrative bodies concerning seizure of foreign investments
may be appealed to Russian courts. 28 Centralized decision mak-
ing and the ability to appeal decisions give investors some guar-
antees of stability.
The Investment Law grants privileges as well. It guaran-
tees foreign investors unconditional rights of repatriation 29 for
certain funds received in foreign currency after all taxes and du-
ties are paid. 30 It guarantees the use of funds which the foreign
investor receives in Russian currency.3 1 These funds may be re-
invested in Russia, used to purchase foreign currency on the in-
ternal market, remitted abroad, or deposited in a bank account
within Russia. 32 The Investment Law gives foreign investors
advantages in customs duties and in the export and import of
goods and services. For example, a customs duty is not levied on
assets brought into Russia if it is the foreign investor's contribu-
tion to a venture, if the item is for the foreign investor's own
production purposes, or if it is for the personal requirements of
foreign personnel at the enterprise. 33 Enterprises with a foreign
investment of thirty percent or more may, without a license, ex-
25. Id. at ch. II, art. 7. Article 7 is not specific about what might entail
"extraordinary circumstances in the interest of the society." Although it pro-
vides protection against seizure of property, this protection is not absolute. Id.
26. Id. Article 7 also provides that a foreign investor has the right to com-
pensation for losses, including the loss of profits incurred as a result of compli-
ance with orders of government bodies, or their officials, that contradict the
legislative acts of Russia. Id. The amount of allowed compensation must corre-
spond to the actual value of the investments at the time the foreign investor
received notice of nationalization, plus interest. Id. at ch. II, art. 8.
27. Id. at ch. II, art. 7.
28. Id.
29. Repatriation is the process by which profits from a foreign investment
are returned to the investor's home country. Frenkel & Sukhman, supra note 1,
at 406.
30. Russian Foreign Investment Law, supra note 23, at ch. II, art. 10.
Funds which may be repatriated include: revenues from investments; amounts
received as settlement claims; amounts received through partial or complete
liquidation; and amounts received because of nationalization. Id.
31. Id. at ch. II, art. 11.
32. Id. Foreign investors may not transfer Russian funds out of the coun-
try. These limitations allow the foreign investor the opportunity to make effec-
tive use of profits without allowing USSR currency out of the country. Id.
33. Id. at ch. IV, art. 24.
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port their own manufactured products and import products to
satisfy their needs.3 4
The Investment Law offers additional guarantees, benefits
and protections to foreign investments in "free economic
zones."35 These benefits include simplified procedures for regis-
tering enterprises,36 preferred tax treatment,37 lower lease rates
for the use of land and other natural resources,38 special cus-
toms treatment,3 9 and easier ways to enter and exit the coun-
try.40 Although the Investment Law establishes guidelines for
the creation of free economic zones and provides general bene-
fits, the details of the zones are specified in the statutes creating
the zones.41
St. Petersburg (Leningrad) exemplifies a free economic
zone.42 This zone demands that the government cap rates for
land rentals, 43 assuring foreign investors of some stability in
forecasting costs. The St. Petersburg zone also provides special
tax benefits. 44
Legislation has been drafted to amend the Law on Foreign
Investments.45 These amendments would provide even more
guarantees and benefits to foreign investors. For example, one
amendment establishes a legal basis for granting tax reductions
or tax exemptions in large investment projects. 46 An additional
34. Id. at ch. IV, art. 25.
35. Id. at ch. VII, arts. 41 & 42. "Free economic zones" are areas which are
established in certain regions of Russia to attract foreign capital, advanced
technology and management experience, and to develop Russian export poten-
tial. Id.
36. Id. at ch. VII, art. 42.
37. Id. This preferred tax treatment includes taxes on profits transferred
abroad. The reduced tax rates in "free economic zones," however, may not be
lower than 50% of the tax rates for foreign investors in other areas of Russia.
38. These rental incentives include the right to a long-term lease of up to
70 years, with the right to sub-lease. Id.
39. The special customs treatment for "free economic zones" includes low-
ered customs duties on the import and export of goods, and a simplified proce-
dure for crossing the border. Id.
40. This simplification of entry and exit also applies to foreign citizens
without visas, since visas are often difficult to acquire. Id.
41. Id.
42. See generally Statute on the Free Enterprise Zone in the City of Lenin-
grad of June 11, 1991, PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & COMP. L. LEGAL MATERIALS-
RUSSIA AND THE REPUBLICS (Foreign Investment section) (1995).
43. Id. at para. 9.
44. Id. at paras. 21,22.
45. Christopher Smeall & Jonathan H. Hines, Pending Changes in Russian
Law May Offer Favorable Provisions for Foreign Investors, RUSSIA AND COM-
MONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Nov. 1, 1993, at 4.
46. Id.
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amendment would protect foreign enterprises having more than
$100,000 in foreign investment from adverse changes in legisla-
tion for ten years following their date of registration. 47 Presi-
dent Yeltsin's Foreign Investment Edict contains a similar
provision protecting foreign investment.48 Unlike the proposed
amendments, there are no monetary requirements for protection
in this Edict.49
B. THE RussiAN PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
Russia promotes foreign investment by allowing foreign
firms to participate in the privatization of its state and munici-
pal enterprises. 50 The 1994 Privatization Program 51 super-
sedes the 1992 program 52 and is even more favorable to foreign
investors.
While the 1994 program expands the rights of foreign inves-
tors in the privatization process, the procedure is complex and
contains restrictions. The privatization program divides the
country's industries into one of five categories: 53 (1) those in
which privatization is prohibited;54 (2) those requiring approval
47. Id. This proposed amendment would contain exceptions for changes in
law relating to national security, the environment, and industrial safety. Id.
48. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
49. Eric K. Johnson, Yeltsin Edict Seeks to Protect Foreign Investors from
Adverse Changes in Future Legislation, RussIA AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L.
REP., Oct. 18, 1993, at 5. The Foreign Investment Edict only applies for three
years. Id.
50. Russian Foreign Investment Law, supra note 23, at ch. V, art. 37. Arti-
cle 37 of the Foreign Investments Act guarantees the right of foreign investors
to take part in the privatization process. Id.
51. Fundamental Provision of the State Program for Privatization of State
and Municipal Enterprises After July 1, 1994 of July 22, 1994, PARKER SCH.
FOREIGN & COMP. L. LEGAL MATERIALs-RussiA AND THE REPUBLICS (Privatiza-
tion and Entrepreneurship section) (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Privatization
Program].
52. For a discussion of the 1992 privatization program, see Georgi G.
Angelov, Legal Framework of Privatization in Russia, 2 MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
207 (1993).
53. The program includes extensive lists designating the categories under
which various industries fall. The most attractive industries for foreign invest-
ment, such as oil and gas industries, defense industries, and manufacturing
industries, generally require federal government and Goskomimushchestvo ap-
proval. New Russian Privatization Program Expands Rights of Foreign Inves-
tors, Adds to List of Restricted Industries, RUSSIA AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L.
REP., Mar. 7, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter New Russian Privatization].
54. Privatization is prohibited for federally owned industries such as: natu-
ral resources; military equipment; nuclear power stations; railroads; radio and
television transmission facilities; facilities for burying radioactive and toxic
waste; and cultural or historical assets. Id.
19961
Miiw. J GLOBAL TRADE
by the federal government;55 (3) those requiring approval by the
State Property Committee or Goskomimushchestvo;5 6 (4) those
controlled by local governments;5 7 and (5) those in which priva-
tization is mandatory. 58 Privatization of certain key industries s
is governed by industry-specific procedures.60
Privatization of industries requiring federal government ap-
proval and Goskomimushchestvo approval may result in one of
several decisions. The federal government or the Gos-
komimushchestvo may prohibit privatizing a particular indus-
try.6 1 In this situation, that industry either becomes an open-
type joint stock company, with the government retaining 100%
of the shares, or a state institution financed from state
sources. 6 2 The government may also permit privatization with
55. Industries that require federal government approval for privatization
include: arms manufacturers; cold storage facilities; enterprises that process
precious metals, precious and semi-precious stones, and radioactive materials;
oil and gas enterprises; refineries; pipelines; coal extraction enterprises; com-
mercial banks; railroad transportation enterprises; maritime and air transpor-
tation industries 'of federal significance;' television and radio broadcasting
companies; printing and publishing houses; certain medical industry facilities;
and certain historical and cultural assets. Privatizing Russia's Industrial Jew-
els Entails Additional Restrictions, RussiA AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP.,
Mar 21, 1994, at 5 [hereinafter Russia's Industrial Jewels].
56. Industries that require Goskomimushchestvo approval include: large
enterprises valued at more than one billion rubles; enterprises not included in
the federal government category or banned from privatization that account for
more than 35 percent of the production of its particular goods or services in the
domestic market; research and development institutes valued at more than one
million rubles and not under any other restricted categories; oil and gas con-
struction enterprises and facilities; liquor, wine, and tobacco production or
packaging; nuclear machine building; baby food production; and certain print-
ing enterprises and publishing houses not under other restrictions. Id.
57. Local governments must approve the privatization of such facilities as
urban and suburban passenger transportation facilities, service facilities, phar-
macies (with a state license), and regional and local seaports. New Russian
Privatization, supra note 53, at 6.
58. Privatization is mandatory for industries in the wholesale and retail
trade, construction and construction materials, food enterprises, taxi services,
bankrupt enterprises, hotels, boarding houses, housing, and certain municipal
service industries. Id.
59. The key industries listed in the 1994 program that require industry-
specific privatization procedures are: oil and gas industries; oil refineries; petro-
leum product support services; defense industries; electric power generation;
nuclear power stations; the coal industry; extraction and processing of precious
metals and stones; railroads; cultural and other facilities attached to enter-
prises undergoing privatization; and the facilities of the Rossiyskii Nikel Rus-
sian joint stock company. Id. at 3.
60. Id.
61. Russia's Industrial Jewels, supra note 55, at 5.
62. Id.
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restrictions, 63 allowing the government to retain a specific
amount of ordinary voting shares of either 51%, 38%, or 25.5%,64
or a "golden share," which permits it to hold a controlling inter-
est in the enterprise.65 The government is limited to holding a
block of shares in a privatized company for a maximum of three
years and can only do so in particular industries. 66 A final op-
tion is to allow privatization without restrictions. 67
The 1994 privatization program allows the foreign investor
to purchase enterprises formerly owned by the central govern-
ment.68 The 1994 program explicitly allows foreign buyers to
purchase privatization vouchers and use them as a means of
payment in the privatization process. 69 Foreign buyers must no-
tify the Russian Finance Ministry of their plans.70 Because this
is the only approval required, the foreign investor does not have
to obtain permission from state committees, ministries, depart-
ments, or regional, local, and municipal governmental bodies. 71
C. PRESIDENTIAL EDICTS TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Under the Russian Constitution,7 2 the President can issue
edicts and directives which have the effect of law.7 3 Presidential




66. The types of industries in which the government may retain a block of
shares include: communications; electric power generation and distribution; ex-
traction, refining, and sale of all natural gas; extraction and processing of pre-
cious metals, stones and radioactive rare-earth materials; arms and munitions
production; production of liquor; freight companies over water and air; airports,
seaports, and river ports; the patent service; research and development enter-
prises; specialized enterprises for constructing or operating facilities for na-
tional security; publishing houses; printing industries; pipelines; the Russian
Circus; wholesale trade enterprises performing purchases for the state; and ex-
port-import operations in connection with international agreements. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 5.
68. New Russian Privatization, supra note 53, at 3.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id.
72. The new Russian Constitution was approved by voter referendum De-
cember 12, 1993. KONST. RSFSR translated in Constitution of the Russian Fed-
eration of Dec. 12, 1993, PARKER SCH. FoREIGN & CoMP. L. LEGAL MATERIALS-
RussiA AND THE REPUBLICS (Constitutional Law section) (1995).
73. The president's power to issue edicts basically allows the president to
bypass the legislature without a counter-signature. Id. at art. 90, cl. 1. The im-
plementation of these edicts is mandatory throughout Russia. Id. at art. 90, cl.
2.
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eral laws of Russia.7 4 President Yeltsin has used this power lib-
erally, and has issued several edicts designed to attract foreign
investors.
1. Edict No. 1466
Presidential Edict No. 146675 contains several measures to
improve the foreign investment climate in Russia. In the past,
rapidly changing laws discouraged foreign investment.7 6 In re-
sponse to this dilemma, Edict 1466 provides that new laws regu-
lating foreign and joint enterprises shall not be applied for three
years to enterprises in existence on the date the legislation is
enacted. 77 This Edict provides a guarantee to foreign investors
that their businesses will not be harmed by adverse changes in
the law for three years.78 The three-year grace period does not
apply to laws benefiting an enterprise, which take effect
immediately. 79
Another commonly cited obstacle to investing in Russia is
uncertainty over whether the federal or local government has
authority to act in a particular field. 80 Edict 1466 provides that
only federal laws and presidential edicts may restrict the activ-
ity of foreign investors. 81 It invalidates other legislation enacted
by federal ministries, departments, regional governments, or lo-
cal governments that restrict foreign investment.8 2 Local and
regional governments may only adopt legislation that promotes
foreign investment. 83 Finally, Edict No. 1466 mandates that the
government produce draft legislation "with a view to ensuring
74. Id. at art. 90, cl. 3.
75. 0 sovershenstvovanii raboti s inostrannymi investitsiami, Ukaz No.
1466, Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On Perfecting the Way of Dealing with
Foreign Investments, Edict No. 1466 of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion] (Sept. 27, 1993) RossrysKirYE VESTI 197 (366), Oct. 12, 1993, at Ill, trans-
lated in Eric K. Johnson, Yeltsin Edict Seeks to Protect Foreign Investors from
Adverse Changes in Future Legislation, RussiA AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L.
REP., Oct. 18, 1993, at 5 [hereinafter Edict No. 1466]. This act directs the Coun-
cil of Ministers to prepare amendments to the Foreign Investment Law.
76. The view of over 100 experienced U.S. companies was that the most
significant barrier to investment in Russia was the uncertainty of the law.
Chamber of Commerce Memo, supra note 22, at 8.
77. Edict No. 1466, supra note 75, at cl. 1.
78. Vadim Bardin, Inostranniy kapital priobryol immunitet ot zakonov Pos-
sii [Foreign Capital Has Acquired Immunity from Russian Laws], KOMMER-
SANT-DAILY 186, Sept. 29, 1993, at 3.
79. Edict No. 1466, supra note 75, at cl. 1.
80. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 8.
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favorable conditions for attracting foreign capital to priority eco-
nomic programs." 4
2. Edict No. 1928
Presidential Edict No. 192885 attempts to reduce risks for
potential investors by allowing the government to share in those
risks. The Edict provides that the Russian government will
fund investment projects with 0.5% of the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP).86 The government will select projects on a competi-
tive basis.87 The Edict requires that private investors provide
80% of the capital, 20% of which must be the investors' own
funds. 8 The government's contribution to a venture can be in
the form of a loan8 9 or the ownership of shares.90 The shares
retained by the government will be sold on the market two years
after it earns profits from the project.9 ' Investors in a project
acquire rights to the property in proportion to their share of ex-
penses.92 Since the investor has a controlling share of the ven-
ture and because the government must sell its shares after two
years, the drawbacks of having the government as a partner are
minimal. The Russian government's financial stake in the en-
terprise may actually add to the stability of the investment. The
government will be reluctant to take action which might dimin-
ish its financial return on the investment.
84. Id. at cl. 3. The legislation to be revised is the law "On Foreign Invest-
ment in the RSFSR," the law "On Free Economic Zones," and the tax laws. The
new package of legislation must also include procedures for foreign investors'
participation in the privatization programs on a par with Russian enterprises,
and procedures for converting Russia's foreign debts into foreign investments.
Id.
85. 0 chastnich investitsiyach v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Ukaz No. 1928
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii [On Private Investment in the Russian Feder-
ation, Edict No. 1928 of the President of the Russian Federation] (Sept. 17,
1994) RossrvsKAYA GAZETA 180 (1037), Sept. 21, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter Edict
No. 1928].
86. Id. at cl. 1.
87. Id. The project submissions must have a business plan, the findings of
a state environmental analysis, and a state non-departmental or independent
analysis. Id. at cl. 3.
88. Id. at cl. 2.
89. Id. at cl. 4 (a).
90. The amount of shares retained by the government will be determined
in accordance with the project's business plan. Id. at cl 4 (b).
91. Id.
92. Id. at cl. 6.
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3. Edict No. 2270
The Russian government has amended its tax laws to make
investment in Russia more attractive to foreigners. 93 Presiden-
tial Edict No. 2270 caps the tax rate on profits from all invest-
ments, including foreign investments.94 The Edict provides that
the federal government profit tax levy is 13%, and regional gov-
ernments may independently set an additional amount if it does
not exceed 25%. 95 This system allows for varying tax rates
around the country,96 which creates uncertainty. On the other
hand, it allows local governments to compete for foreign invest-
ments by creating attractive tax rates.97
The Edict provides that if the new tax structure creates less
advantageous conditions for those who are already operating a
business under old tax laws, the older, more beneficial laws will
apply. 98 The Edict also encourages improvements in technology
by tax-exempting profits if they are reinvested in scientific re-
search and experimental design work.99 The expected amount,
however, must not exceed 10% of the taxable profit of the enter-
prise. 100 The Edict stimulates the development of small enter-
prises' 0 1 by exempting certain small businesses from taxes on
profits during the first two years of operation. 10 2 These enter-
prises must operate in preferred activities, 0 3 and the income
93. Revisions of the existing tax law was accomplished by Edict No. 2270 of
the Russian President, On Certain Amendments to Taxation and the Interrela-
tionship of Budgets at Various Levels of December 22, 1993, in RussiA AND
COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., April 18, 1994, at 9 [hereinafter Edict No. 2270].
94. Id. at para. 2.
95. Id.
96. Finer Points in the Russian Tax Edict Offer Foreign Investors Benefits,
Restrictions, RussiA AND COMMoNWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Apr. 18, 1994, at 5.
Russia is comprised of 88 separate local regions or oblasts. Therefore, under the
new tax structure it is possible that each could have a separate profit tax rate
causing fragmentation of the tax regime. Jeffirey M. Trinklein, Russia Makes
Significant Changes to Profits Tax, Amends Excess Wages Tax and VAT, 8 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1039 n.5 (1994).
97. Finer Points in the Russian Tax Edict Offer Foreign Investors Benefits,
Restrictions, supra note 96, at 5.
98. Edict No. 2270, supra note 93, at para.33.
99. Id. at para. 5.
100. Id.
101. The edict defines small enterprises as those in which the average
number of employees does not exceed 200 individuals and in which state and
municipal ownership does not exceed 25%. Id.
102. Id. at para. 9.
103. The profit tax exemption applies to all small enterprises engaged in the
production of agricultural output, production of food produce, consumer goods,
medical equipment, medicinal preparations, items for medical use, technical
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derived from these activities must amount to 70% or more of the
total income of the enterprise.10 4 During the third year of opera-
tion, the tax rate for these industries is 25% of the normal rate,
and in the fourth year, 50% of the normal rate, provided that
90% of the income is derived from the preferred activity.10 5 In
addition to all these favorable changes, however, Edict No. 2270
also expands the scope of the Russian tax on excess wages, a
change which will be detrimental to foreign investors.10 6
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS CREATED TO ATTRACT
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. U.S.-RussiA TAx TREATY
As a means of alleviating the problems of the Russian tax
regime,' 07 the United States and Russia formed a tax treaty in
1992.108 The protocol to the treaty provides that any "qualified
Russian entity",10 9 and any banking, insurance or other finan-
cial business carried on in Russia by a permanent establishment
owned by a U.S. resident, can continue to calculate its tax as
provided under the profit tax existing before the treaty, regard-
less of any Russian domestic tax law changes." 0 This guaran-
teed treatment does not apply to permanent establishments
outside of the financial industry."'
equipment for disability prevention and disability rehabilitation, and in the




106. For a discussion of the excess wage tax, see infra Part 1V.B.
107. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the problems of the Russian tax
system).
108. Convention Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital of June 17, 1992, PARKER
SCH. FOREIGN & CoMP. L. LEGAL MATERIALS-RussIA AND THE REPUBLICS (Fi-
nancial and Banking Law section) (1995) [hereinafter U.S.-Russia Treaty]. Rus-
sia ratified the U.S.-Russia Treaty on October 22, 1992, and the U.S. Senate
ratified the treaty on November 20, 1993. The Treaty has been in force since
January 1, 1994. Trinklein, supra note 96, at 1040 n.7.
109. The protocol to the U.S.-Russia Treaty defines a "qualified Russian en-
tity" as an entity that is a resident of Russia and at least 30% beneficially
owned by residents of the United States, and that has a total corporate capital
of at least $100,000. U.S.-Russia Treaty, supra note 108, Protocol, para. 8(b).
110. U.S.-Russia Treaty, supra note 108, Protocol, para. 8(c).
111. Jeffrey M. Trinklein, The U.S.-Russia Tax Treaty: Has the Foreign Tax
Credit Issue Been Resolved?, 5 TAx NOTES INT'L 699, 700 (1992).
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B. U.S.-RussIA TREATY CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT
AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT
To stimulate capital flow and the economic development of
both countries, the United States and Russia have signed a
treaty to encourage and protect investment"n 2 This treaty
guarantees that investments in Russia and the United States
will receive "national treatment."113 National treatment is de-
fined within the treaty as "treatment that is at least as favorable
as the better of the most favorable treatment accorded by a
party to state enterprises or to other companies or nationals of
that party in like circumstances." 114 This is not an unlimited
benefit, as the national treatment provision is subject to reserva-
tions made in the annex of the treaty. 115 The treaty also pro-
vides that investments must receive treatment consistent with
the norms and principles of international law. 1 6 Furthermore,
investments made under the treaty may only be expropriated or
nationalized for a public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner, upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensa-
112. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federa-
tion Concerning The Encouragement And Reciprocal Protection of Investment
of June 17, 1992, PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & COMP. L. LEGAL MATERLS-RussIA
AND THE REPUBLICS (Foreign Investment Section) (1995) [hereinafter Invest-
ment Treaty].
113. Id. at art. II.
114. Id. at art. I (1)(h).
115. Id. at art. II (1). The Russian government reserved the right to main-
tain exceptions to national treatment in the following areas: electric power pro-
duction; production of uranium and other fissionable materials; ownership of
land and use of subsoil and natural resources; marine and inland sea fisheries;
construction, installation, operation, and maintenance of communications lines;
ownership and brokerage of real estate; mining and processing of ores of pre-
cious metals, rare earth metals and precious stones; air transport, ocean and
river shipping; state loans; state grants; banking activities; brokerage and deal-
erships in securities and currency values; ownership of state securities; acquisi-
tion of state and municipal property in the process of privatization; insurance;
mass media companies; and private detective and security services. Id. at An-
nex (1). The United States reserved the following exceptions: air transportation;
ocean and coastal shipping; banking; insurance; government grants; govern-
ment insurance and loan programs; energy and power production; custom
house brokers; ownership of real property; ownership and operation of broad-
cast or common carrier radio and television stations; ownership and shares in
the Communications Satellite Corporation; the provision of common carrier tel-
ephone and telegraph services; the provision of submarine cable services; use of
land and natural resources; mining on the public domain; primary dealership in
United States government securities; maritime services and maritime-related
services. Id. at Annex (2).
116. Id. at art. II (2)(a).
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tion, and in accordance with due process of law.117 In cases of
expropriation, the compensation shall be paid without delay. 118
The measure of the compensation is the fair market value of the
investment immediately before expropriation plus interest from
the date of the taking. 119 A party is given the right of judicial or
administrative review to determine if the expropriation and
compensation conform with the principles of international
law.120
Protection of investments is extended to losses suffered dur-
ing war, revolution, a state of emergency, insurrection, and civil
disturbance. 121 The treaty specifically states that each party
shall provide equitable treatment in terms of taxation. 122 In ad-
dition, the treaty provides detailed procedures for dispute reso-
lution, including negotiation, consultation, and international
tribunals. 123 Russia and the United States will enforce any ar-
bitral awards within their territories. 124 This commitment to
enforce awards is important since the treaty is applicable to the
political subdivisions of both countries. 125
C. INVESTMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Russia and the United States have also created certain or-
ganizations to promote and guarantee investments in Russia.
An example of such an organization is the Russian Govern-
ment's Consultative Council for Foreign Investments, which was
formed in 1994.126 The Council is led by the Chairman of the
Russian Government and is composed of ministers of the Rus-
sian cabinet as well as leaders from some of the largest Western
industrial and financial companies. 127 The Council hears the
concerns of potential investors. The Council utilizes the West-
ern businessperson's perspective on how to increase investments
117. Id. at art. 111 (1).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at art. III (2).
121. Id. at art. 111 (3).
122. Id. at art. XI (1).
123. Id. at art. VI.
124. Id. at art. VI (3)(e).
125. Id. at art. XII.
126. Vladimir Lagovskiy, V vozdukhye zapakhlo investitsiyami [The smell of
investment in the air], RABOCHAYA TRmUNA 120 (1019), July 19, 1994, at 1.
127. Council for Foreign Investment Set Up, June 30, 1994, F.B.I.S.-Sov.
94-126, at 20. [hereinafter Council Set Up]. Some of the Western firms listed as
participating in the Council are ABB, Coca-Cola, United Technologies and Gulf
Canada. Id.
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in Russia by overcoming barriers to foreign investment. 128 It is
made up of three working groups, including a group for the in-
vestment climate, one for tax legislation, and another for the
creation of a normal image of the Russian economy abroad. 29
The Council will meet several times a year to discuss investment
in Russia.1 30
The governments of Russia and the United States created a
similar organization. The "Partnership for Economic Progress,"
an agreement reached between President Clinton and President
Yeltsin on September 28, 1994, claims that each country is striv-
ing to provide the other with free access to its market for goods
and services.' 3 ' To facilitate this commitment, the Russian-
American Committee for the Development of Business Coopera-
tion has become a valuable forum for discussing the issues of
fair trade and access to markets. 3 2
In addition to organizations that work to promote invest-
ment, both Russia and the United States have formed agencies
that guarantee investment in Russia. Yeltsin's presidential
edict on February 5, 1993 created the State Investment Corpora-
tion.' 33 The purpose of the corporation is to create favorable
conditions for foreign investment, as well as to protect Russia's
state interests.3 4 The principle task of the corporation is to in-
sure foreign investors against political risks. 3 5 The corporation
holds one billion dollars worth of property to guarantee Western
investments.136
128. Conference on Foreign Investments Opens in Moscow, June 27, 1994,
F.B.I.S.-Sov. 94-123, at 14. Viktor Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister of the Rus-
sian Government and head of the Council, stated the purpose of the Council:
"We would like to know what ways western business people suggest for increas-
ing investments in Russia, what is hampering their work and how the Russian
Government could help remove the unnecessary barriers on their way, includ-
ing in the sphere of taxation." Id.
129. Council Set Up, supra note 127, at 20.
130. Id.
131. U.S. 'Partnership for Economic Progress' Detailed, Sept. 29, 1994,
F.B.I.S.-Sov. 94-189, at 15.
132. Id.
133. Leonid Brodsky, Korporatsiya budet strakhovat' otpoliticheskikh riskov
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The United States has committed $2.5 billion this year to
guarantee investments in Russia.13 7 These funds will be held by
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation138 (OPIC), a fed-
eral agency providing American businesses with loan guaran-
tees and insurance against political risks in developing
countries.139 OPIC funds should generate investment in Russia
because the guarantees will overcome American companies' con-
cerns about political uncertainty.1 40
IV. PROBLEM AREAS WITH EXISTING LAW
Existing Russian law demonstrates a strong commitment to
attract foreign capital to its economy. These laws grant various
assurances and guarantees to foreign investors that government
regulation or action will not arbitrarily and adversely affect
their investments.' 41 It is important to realize, however, that
these laws have not effectively solved all the problems facing in-
vestors in the volatile Russian market. For instance, the ex-
isting legislation has not adequately addressed the barriers to
foreign participation in the privatization process. Furthermore,
Russian legislation has fallen short in addressing problems in
taxation, currency convertibility, infrastructure, crime, culture,
and political instability.
A. OBSTACLES TO FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN THE
PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
Although the 1994 privatization program creates new bene-
fits for foreign investors, several barriers remain. Government
approval of investment in certain industries discourages foreign
investors. 142 Such approval can delay a project and can be very
costly. Governmental approval is necessary for industries that
are the most attractive to foreign investors, such as the oil and
gas or defense industries, because Russia does not want to lose
control over these industries.1 43 Even if a foreign buyer receives
permission to purchase a business in a restricted industry, fur-
ther restrictions may prevent foreign participation. For exam-
137. Agis Salpukas, Texaco Gets Aid to Invest In Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1993, at Di.
138. Id.
139. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
140. Salpukas, supra note 137, at D12.
141. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
143. New Russian Privatization, supra note 53, at 4.
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ple, the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service has the
right to recommend to the government that it prohibit foreign
investors from acquiring a restricted industry.144 The govern-
ment can take such action within one month after foreign inves-
tors have already purchased the industry at auction. 145
Another barrier to foreign investment in Russian privatiza-
tion is the uncertainty of real property ownership.146 Since Rus-
sian law does not provide for land ownership by foreign
investors, privatization only gives the foreign investor owner-
ship of the business and not the actual land upon which it
rests. 147 Until the uncertainty of property ownership is settled,
foreign participation in the Russian privatization process will be
minimal. 148
The fact that purchases must be made in rubles further dis-
courages foreign investors from participating in the privatiza-
tion process. 149  The 1994 program requires that all
privatization transactions by foreign investors be made in rubles
or vouchers. 150 Currency convertibility problems also impede
foreign participation in the privatization process.' 51 Central
Bank instructions specify that foreign investors must use special
ruble accounts to make investments in Russia, 152 and opening a
ruble account is a bureaucratic nightmare. 15 3
Another barrier to foreign participation in the privatization
process is that the investor may be responsible for any liability
attached to the business. Neither the Foreign Investments Act
nor the 1994 privatization program guarantees that a foreign in-
144. Id. This provision does not provide any due process. It merely states
that following the auction, information about the successful foreign bidder will
be sent to the federal government and the counterintelligence service. The gov-
ernment then adopts a decree based on the counterintelligence service's recom-
mendation. Id.
145. Id.
146. Ted Smith, The Foreign Investment Regime Of The Russian Federa-
tion: Progress Toward A System Of Free Entry, 11 UCLA PAC. BASmN L.J. 310,
323 (1993).
147. Id. at 325.
148. Id.
149. New Russian Privatization, supra note 53, at 4.
150. Id.
151. Foreign investors are discouraged from dealing in rubles since this cur-
rency is unstable and is not freely convertible on the world market. See infra
Part IV.C.
152. New Russian Privatization, supra note 53, at 4.
153. Christopher Osakwe, Modern Russian Law of Banking And Security
Transactions: A Biopsy Of Post-Soviet Russian Commercial Law, 14 WHIriER
L. REv., 301, 351 (1993).
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vestor will not be held liable for environmental damage done
before the investor acquired the industry. 54 Because investors
cannot foresee potential liability at the time of privatization,
they are usually taking a gamble by purchasing the industry. A
legislative guarantee that foreign investors will not be held lia-
ble for environmental damage which occurred before the indus-
try was acquired through privatization would eliminate this risk
and increase foreign participation. 155
There are several other reasons why Russian privatization
has not been attractive to foreigners. Foreign investors hesitate
to acquire an industry when the government retains a control-
ling share.' 5 6 Although the government can only retain its
share for three years, the uncertainty and risk of having an un-
stable government as a business partner discourages foreign in-
vestors. The slow and complex procedures that govern Russian
privatization and the inadequate infrastructure of existing in-
dustries also discourage foreign investors.' 5 7
B. TAXATION As AN OBSTACLE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The Russian tax regime is the primary remaining obstacle
to foreign investment. 58 Many different levels and types of
taxes, instability in the tax legislation, and uncertain enforce-
ment of the tax regime all inhibit foreign investment. Existing
law has failed to resolve these issues. A recent survey by the
Russian Ministry of Finance indicated that there are at present
forty-four different types of taxes in Russia at various levels.' 5 9
154. Smith, supra note 146, at 329.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 325.
157. Frenkel & Sukhman, supra note 1, at 403.
158. Yevgeniy Rusakov, Zavershilsya vizit B. Yeltsina v SShA A "stariki'po
ryumke vzyalu, soidyasya v Rozabom sadu. Shto ombetilyi Prezidyent RSFSR i
byvshiy direktor TsRu na voprosi cobkora "RT" v Soyedinennikh Shtatakh
Yevgeniy Rusakov [B. Yeltsin completes visit in U.S.A., 'Old Men" Meet in Rose
Garden With a Glass of Wine Each. How Russian Federation President and For-
mer CIA Director Replied to Questions From Yevgeniy Rusakov, RABOCHAYA
TRIBUNA's Own Correspondent in United States], RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 170
(1069), Oct. 1, 1994, at 1. During a meeting with members of the western busi-
ness community, President Yeltsin tried to alleviate their hesitancy to invest in
Russia. The business community cited tax as an obstacle to investment. Yeltsin
recognized that there were faults in the Russian tax system. "We ourselves re-
alize that in 1991, when it was born again, Russia rather hastily drew up a law
on taxes that contained some mistakes which are affecting both our business-
men and foreigners." Id. Yeltsin indicated that a new tax code is in prepara-
tion, and should be adopted in the next year. Id.
159. Russian Budget Law Outlines Various Taxes, Sets Tax Rates For Cer-
tain Taxes, RussiAN AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Aug. 8, 1994, at 1.
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These include sixteen federal taxes, 160 five regional taxes, and
twenty-three local taxes. 161 The Russian tax system also relies
heavily on payroll, gross income or expenditures without regard
to profitability. 162 This burdensome tax system can make an al-
ready high-risk investment less profitable. 163
Russia recognizes the problems created by its tax system
and is attempting to correct them. Proposed legislation would
suspend profit taxes during the first five years after a company's
registration. 6 4 It would also exempt the import of machines,
technological equipment, spare parts, raw materials, and compo-
nent parts for production from taxation or customs duties. 65
To successfully attract foreign investment, Russia must al-
leviate other problems in the old tax regime. One such problem
is the excess wage tax, which taxes employers for excessive sal-
ary payments at the same rate profits are taxed.' 66 Ironically,
160. Current federal taxes imposed in Russia include, but are not limited to:
profits tax (35%-38%); excess wage tax; withholding tax; payroll taxes (40% of
compensation); road use tax (generally .4% of gross sales); property tax (2% per
annum); VAT (generally 23% with new Special Tax added); import tariff
(although rates vary by category, generally 15%); excise tax (varies by good but
rate for imports is higher than that for domestic goods); export tariffs (assessed
without regard to profitability). Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at
4.
161. Regions and localities in Russia create new taxes at any rate. These
taxes will not be deductible in calculating profits tax. Examples of local taxes
are Moscow's advertising tax and its tax on visitors. Id.
162. Id.
163. Huntsman International is an example of an American corporation
forced out of Russia as a result of the unpredictable tax structure. The company
was promised an exemption from paying taxes for five years. This concession,
however, was canceled by presidential edict. The company was then required to
pay a 40% tax on all of its assets, numerous fines, and an interest rate of 250%.
The total cost of the changed policy to Huntsman was $500,000. Vladimir
Mikheyev, Amerikanskiye Investitsii v Rossiyu: Odni Ukhodyat, Drugiye
Prikhodyat [American Investment In Russia: Some Go, Others Come], IZVESTrIYA
175 (24282), Sept. 13, 1994, at 1.
164. Sergei Rybak & Ivan Zasursky, Politicheskovo Riska Bol'she Hyet [No
Political Risk Any Longer], NEZAVISimAYA GAZETA 120 (796), June 29, 1994, at
1-2.
165. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdrin, chair of the Russian
Government Consultative Council for Foreign Investments commented on up-
coming legislation, which privileges businesses with foreign investment. He in-
dicated that revisions of the new tax code would be beneficial to foreign
investors. Chernomyrdrin On Measures To Encourage Foreign Investment,
June 28, 1994, F.B.I.S.-Sov. 94-124, at 24.
166. The excess wage tax is a tax at the profits tax rate (13% to the federal
budget and a separate amount to the regional government not to exceed 25%)
on the amount of an employee's salary that exceeds six times the minimum
monthly wage (currently 140,620 rubles). Therefore, any salary greater than
roughly $50.00 a month is taxed at 38%. Edict No. 2270, supra note 93, para. 3.
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under this regime almost every Russian employee qualifies as
being excessively paid. 167 Because Edict No. 2270 provides that
the excess wage tax applies regardless of whether the enterprise
is profitable, it is not a tax on net income, but an additional tax
on expenditures. 16
8
The stated purpose of the excess wage tax was to prevent
state-owned enterprises from increasing wages without corre-
sponding improvements in efficiency, thereby protecting the gov-
ernment treasury.169 A more general purpose of the act was to
control wage inflation. 170 In effect, however, the excess wage tax
discourages higher levels of employment and stifles attempts to
reward employees for hard work.171 It also discourages employ-
ees from learning new skills and developing a healthy work
ethic.' 7 2
The excess wage tax hinders the formation of a capitalist
economy. Russia's transition to a market economy requires the
market to determine wages in order to promote pay for perform-
ance. 173 This tax is also inconsistent with international stan-
dards, 174 and may be deemed non-creditable 75 in the countries
of some foreign investors. 176 For example, under U.S. law the
excess wage tax does not qualify for a foreign tax credit since it
is a tax on expenditures and not a tax on net income. 177 Elimi-
nation of the excess wage tax will ease the financial burden on
foreign investors, give workers incentive to excel, and conform
with principles of a market economy.
167. Scott C. Antel, Demise of Russia's Excess Wage Tax Is Victory for Free
Market Theory, 9 TAx NOTES INT'L 1311 (1994).
168. Edict No. 2270, supra note 93, at para. 3.
169. Arthur Anderson & Co., Proposals For Encouraging Investment And
Rationalization/Simplification of Taxation System 5 (Apr. 1994) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinafter Arthur Anderson memo]. The
purposes of the excess wage tax are not a reasonable explanation for punishing
private enterprises, especially foreign businesses. Therefore, an enterprise with
any foreign investment should not be subject to this tax. Id.
170. Russian Finance Ministry Proposes Tax Changes, Including Excess
Wage Tax Phase-Out, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1050 (1994) [hereinafter Tax Changes].
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Arthur Anderson memo, supra note 169, at 5.
174. Id.
175. Section 901(a) of the Internal Revenue Code permits foreign tax credit
for income taxes paid or accrued to a foreign country. IRC § 901(a). For a discus-
sion on determining if the Russian profit tax is eligible for the foreign tax credit,
see generally Trinklein, supra note 111.
176. Arthur Anderson memo, supra note 169, at 5.
177. Trinklein, supra note 96, at 1041.
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After the original profits tax was enacted, the Supreme So-
viet decreed that the excess wage tax would not apply to enter-
prises wholly owned by foreign investors or to foreign legal
persons acting in Russia through permanent representative of-
fices.178 The language of Edict No. 2270, however, states that
"all taxpayers"179 will pay the excess wages tax. This suggests
that the previous exclusion for wholly foreign-owned enterprises
and foreign permanent representations no longer applies.' 80 A
Russian Government resolution claims the Russian excess wage
tax extends to Russian legal entities wholly owned by foreign
investors.' 8 ' No official statement applies the excess wage tax
to foreign legal entities doing business in Russia through repre-
sentative offices. 182
Applying the excess wage tax to foreign entities violates the
U.S.-Russia Tax Treaty. 83 The U.S.-Russia treaty permits qual-
ified Russian entities to deduct actual wages from profit
taxes.' 84 Similarly, U.S. corporations that maintain permanent
establishments in Russia are allowed to deduct all expenses in
determining profits.' 85 Arguably, wholly foreign-owned Russian
entities and U.S. permanent establishments may claim that the
excess wage tax violates the treaty because it denies deductions
for actual wages paid.'8 6
The excess wage tax also violates the treaty provision which
allows wholly foreign-owned Russian entities and permanent es-
tablishments in the financial sector to calculate taxes under the
old profits tax regardless of changes in Russian law.' 8 7 Edict
No. 2270 removes the excess wage exclusion to the detriment of
U.S. firms. As a result, U.S. entities have a right under the
treaty to continue calculating their tax under the profits tax law
in force at the time the U.S.-Russia Treaty was signed.' 8 8 For
178. Id. at 1040.
179. Edict No. 2270, supra note 93, at para. 3.
180. Trinklein, supra note 96, at 1040.
181. Scott C. Antel, Tax Planning Can Reduce Effects of Excess Wages Tax
on Wholly Foreign-Owned Russian Legal Entities, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 1435,
1436 (1994).
182. Scott C. Antel, Russia's Excess Wages Tax Applies to Wholly Foreign-
Owned Russian Legal Entities, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 1197 (1994). The prevailing
expert opinion is that the Russian Government intends to include representa-
tive offices in the scope of this tax. Id.
183. Trinklein, supra note 96, at 1040.
184. U.S.-Russia Treaty, supra note 108, Protocol, para. 8(b).
185. Id. at art. 6, cl. 3.
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these reasons, some Russian tax officials interpret the U.S.-Rus-
sia Treaty to exempt U.S. companies from the excess wages tax,
while others maintain that U.S. companies are subject to the
tax.18
9
The Russian government realizes that the excess wage tax
burdens foreign investment. It is reluctant to act, however, be-
cause the tax makes up twenty to twenty-five percent of all taxes
collected. 190 Therefore, the government has proposed to gradu-
ally phase out the excess wage tax and allow the revenue to be
made up elsewhere. 191 One proposal raises the threshold salary
from six times to eight times the minimum monthly wages for
certain enterprises, and eliminates the excess wage tax for all
wholly foreign-owned Russian enterprises and representative of-
fices. 192 Another proposal cancels the excess wage tax and in-
creases the profit tax rate.1 93
Current legislation provides no protection against the ex-
cess wage tax, and the U.S.-Russia Tax Treaty's protection is
unclear. Therefore, until proposals eliminating the excess wage
tax are enacted, a foreign investor must attempt to reduce the
impact of the tax. Split employment contracts partially circum-
vent the excess wage tax. A split contract pays a foreign em-
ployee working partly in Russia and partly outside Russia under
separate employment contracts.194 Under this procedure only
wages earned in Russia are subject to the excess wages tax. 9 5
Another way to minimize the effects of the excess wage tax is to
use compensation items not included in the excess wage tax
such as allowances and benefits.1 96 Payments can be reclassi-
fied as management service or consulting fees which are not sub-
ject to the tax.197
Uncertainty and instability plagues the existing tax regime.
The Russian government has altered its tax laws continuously,
189. Excess Wages Tax Not to Apply to U.S. Firms, RussiA AND COMMON-
WEALTH Bus. L. REP., May 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library,
RCBLR File. The statement that the U.S.-Russia Treaty would take precedence
over Russian law to exempt U.S. firms from the tax was made by Vladimir
Gusev, chairman of the State Tax Service. Id.




194. Trinklein, supra note 96, at 1042.
195. Id.
196. Antel, supra note 181, at 1436.
197. Id. at 1435.
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radically, generally without notice, and often retroactively. 198
An investment that is profitable under one tax regime may be
unprofitable or even unworkable when the tax law suddenly
changes. This instability considerably increases the risk of in-
vesting in Russia. 199 To alleviate this instability, "grandfather-
ing" principles would protect investors by ensuring that changes
in the tax regime would not affect economic decisions made
under a previous law.20 0 Although Presidential Edict No. 2270
partially achieves this goal, its guarantee against adverse
changes in taxation only applies to changes contained in Edict
2270 itself and does not protect against other legislation.201
Similarly, although the U.S.-Russia Tax Treaty provides limited
protections against adverse changes, it only protects against ad-
verse changes in determining profit taxes. 20 2 The treaty is also
limited to qualified Russian entities and permanent establish-
ments in the financial industry. 203
Presidential Edict No. 1466 gives existing investments more
general protection against adverse changes in legislation. It
provides that no unfavorable legislation will apply to then ex-
isting foreign companies and Russian joint ventures within
three years of its enactment. 20 4 This protection from unfavora-
ble legislation, however, has not actually materialized in the
area of taxation.20 5 Since the Edict's enactment, several tax
changes have directly impacted foreign investors. 20 6 The most
notable change was the repeal of the excess wage tax exemption
previously extended to wholly foreign-owned Russian enter-
prises.20 7 Authorities in the Moscow Tax Inspectorate and State
198. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 4.
199. Arthur Anderson memo, supra note 169, at 6.
200. Id.
201. Edict No. 2270, supra note 93, para. 33.
202. U.S.-Russia Treaty, supra note 108, Protocol, paras. 8(b) & 8(c).
203. Id. For a definition of qualified Russian entity, see supra note 109.
204. Edict No. 1466 supra note 75, at cl. 1.
205. Changes in the tax law since the declaration of Edict 1466 have made
no mention of the grace period allowed under clause 1 of Edict 1466. Further-
more, those implementing the new tax legislation have not adhered to the Edict
either. Arthur Anderson memo, supra note 169, at 6.
206. Scott C. Antel & Oleg Lesnichy, Applicability of Russia's Foreign In-
vestment Decree No. 1466 Generates Discussion, 8 TAX NoTEs INT'L 1705 (1994).
The tax changes that came into effect after the enactment of Edict No. 1466
were the repeal of the exemption from the excess wage tax that had previously
been allowed for wholly foreign owned Russian enterprises, the extension of
the VAT base, the local one percent education needs tax based on payroll, and
the one dollar per-day tourist tax. Id.
207. Id.
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Revenue Service do not agree whether Edict No. 1466 exempts
foreign investors from the new taxes.208 Until this issue is re-
solved, foreign investors can abide by the unfavorable tax
changes enacted since Edict 1466, or risk incurring substantial
penalties for not paying the taxes and challenging their validity
under 1466.209 Excess wage tax exemption adds to the uncer-
tainty and instability that Edict No. 1466 was designed to elimi-
nate. Significant investment will not occur as long as investors
are unable to rely on stable tax legislation.
Procedural reforms could improve certainty and stability in
the Russian tax system. An official and binding private ruling
procedure may be such an improvement. This procedure would
allow individuals and companies to request a binding ruling
from tax authorities, in advance, on complicated transactions or
interpretations. 210 Publication of all laws and directives would
also provide certainty and stability to the tax regime. Cur-
rently, tax laws, regulations, instructions, and rulings are not
published in a single official publication. Until an official publi-
cation is created, taxpayers must scour dozens of publications
each day in search of new laws that might affect them.211 Publi-
cation would also harmonize non-tax and tax legislation. Tax
and non-tax laws have conflicted in the past and may continue
to conflict with the enactment of the Law on Foreign Investment
and the new civil code. 212
Additionally, the Russian tax system does not allow the de-
duction of all necessary expenses. The present profit tax law
only allows the deduction of items included in the cost of produc-
tion.213 The tax law could be revised to provide for the deduc-
tion of necessary expenses which are not included in the cost of
production. In order to bring higher technology to Russian in-
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Arthur Anderson memo, supra note 169, at 2.
211. The American Chamber of Commerce in Moscow further recommends
that new tax laws, regulations, instructions, or rulings should go into effect
three months after official publication. In addition, a public comment period
should be implemented in the drafting of regulations. The Chamber also recom-
mends that tax laws should be codified to provide discipline in the drafting pro-
cess and consistency in definitions and interpretations. Chamber of Commerce
memo, supra note 22, at 5.
212. Lack of coordination between the Law on Foreign Investment, which
created branches of foreign legal entities and the tax law, has caused uncer-
tainty in how to tax the branches. To avoid further uncertainty, there must be
coordination of legislation with the tax laws. Arthur Anderson memo, supra
note 169, at 7.
213. Id. at 6.
19961 147
18 Mw. J GLOBAL TRADE
dustry, the cost of production must also include expenses for
training, research and development.214 If certain expenses are
not deductible, some countries may declare that the Russian tax
will not be allowed as a credit against their own domestic tax
laws.215
C. CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY
The difficulty of converting Russian currency on the world
market further impedes foreign investment in Russia. 216 De-
gree of currency convertibility is based in part on economic re-
forms designed to eliminate price controls and government
subsidies to Russian industries.21 7 Since the government has
indicated that it intends to issue subsidies and price controls
again this year, it appears that the Russian ruble will not be-
come freely convertible in the near future. 218 Although the ru-
ble is internally convertible,21 9 foreign investors still prefer to
avoid dealing in rubles due to fluctuating exchange rates and
inflation. Currently, no Russian legislation deals directly with
the currency convertibility problems. To overcome this barrier,
investors must rely on creative business practices.
One way to avoid the currency convertibility problem is
counter-trade. Under this principle, the foreign investor agrees
to trade its product for another product, usually a commodity or
raw material which can be sold on the world market for hard
currency. 220 Unfortunately, some commodities are difficult to
find and in short supply.221 Stringent export and licensing re-
quirements also make counter-trade difficult. 22 2 For these rea-
sons, counter-trade is only a limited alternative to true currency
conversion.
214. Id. at 7.
215. The accounting firm of Arthur Anderson suggests that the government
should provide guidance as to what expenses are necessary. Id. at 6.
216. Davis & Sokota, supra note 5, at 488.
217. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 5.
218. Id. The Government intends to issue substantial credits primarily to
the agriculture and coal industries. However, other industries have threatened
to strike if the they are excluded from the government subsidies. Id.
219. See id.
220. As an example of counter trade, Davis and Sokota cite to a practice
conducted by PepsiCo. As part of its profits from the sale of Pepsi Cola in Rus-
sia, PepsiCo may take Russian mushrooms for use by its Pizza Hut subsidiary
outside of Russia. Davis & Sokota, supra note 5, at 489 n.68.
221. Id. at 489.
222. Dean, supra note 18, at 335.
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Another way to avoid dealing in rubles is to manufacture
goods sold on the world market for hard currency.223 In order to
do so, however, the venture must produce goods of such high
quality that they can compete in a more sophisticated market.
The stagnation of the Russian manufacturing industry makes
this difficult,224 and many foreign investors avoid the currency
convertibility problem by simply selling services to the interna-
tional community. 225 Such enterprises include restaurants,
communication companies, consulting firms, and hotels. All of
these service industries can raise hard currency by making di-
rect sales to customers. 226
Even if foreign investors sell goods and services for hard
currency, they cannot entirely avoid the pitfalls of currency con-
vertibility. Russian enterprises are required to convert fifty per-
cent of any foreign currency sale into rubles by selling the profits
on either the currency market or to the Central Bank of Rus-
sia.227 This currency conversion requirement prevents many
companies with foreign currency sales from purchasing the tech-
nology and equipment needed to modernize Russian indus-
tries.228 Article 25 of the Russian Law on Foreign Investment
would have resolved these problems by exempting enterprises
with foreign investments of thirty percent or more from the re-
quirement of mandatory currency conversion.229 Russian cur-
rency enactments, however, removed this exemption.230 Despite
the negative impact this requirement has on foreign investors, a
proposal for increasing the mandatory currency requirement to
100% of foreign currency sales is presently under considera-
tion. 231 Such a requirement would, of course, make it even more
difficult for Russian companies to import badly needed western
technology and equipment. 23 2
223. Davis & Sokota, supra note 5, at 488.
224. Id. at 489.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The currency conversion requirement is intended to apply only to ex-
ports. However, banks also apply these rules to internal hard currency transac-
tions. For this reason, it should be made clear that conversion of hard currency
sales is not required for purely domestic sales. Arthur Anderson memo, supra
note 169, at 9.
228. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 6.
229. Russian Foreign Investment Law, supra note 23, at ch. IV, art. 25.
230. Hard Currency Regulations Remove Exemptions for Foreign Investor,
RussIA & COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., Aug. 24, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Hard
Currency].
231. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 6.
232. Id.
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In order to attract foreign investment, the Russian govern-
ment must address the currency convertibility problems. First,
it must control inflation in order to stabilize the economy and
the ruble, thereby accelerating the progression to a freely con-
vertible ruble.2 33 Second, it should exempt Russian companies
from the mandatory currency conversion requirement when
they purchase technology or equipment. 234 Finally, it must ex-
empt from mandatory conversion all foreign currency sales by
foreign companies.
D. INFRASTRUCTURE
Russia's deteriorating physical infrastructure frustrates po-
tential foreign investors. Transportation services are outdated,
and communications systems are both ineffective and expen-
sive.235 There is also a shortage of housing and office space for
foreigners. 23 6 One solution is to rebuild the failing infrastruc-
ture by introducing new technology. Unfortunately, this re-
quires money that the Russian government does not currently
possess. One proposal suggests raising revenue through munici-
pal bonds or similar means. 23 7 An alternative solution is to give
Western companies incentives to aid in the development of the
infrastructure. These companies can provide the technology and
finances to improve transportation, construction, and communi-
cations in Russia.
The problems associated with the deteriorating physical in-
frastructure are compounded by the lack of market infrastruc-
ture. Ivan Korolyev, the director of the Institute of World
Economics and International Relations, stated that the main ob-
stacle to foreign investment in Russia is not legislative restric-
tions, but the "actual absence of market infrastructure in
Russia."238
233. Id.
234. An example of such an exemption was a purchase financed to Lukoil (a
Russian privatized integrated oil company) by the Japanese EximBank, Id.
235. Dean, supra note 18, at 337 (noting that, in 1991, mere installation of a
direct-dial long distance telephone line could cost as much as $20,000).
236. Id.
237. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 7.
238. Boris Yeltsin: Russkiy dolgo zapagayem, no bystro yedet [Boris Yeltsin:
Russian Slow to Harness, But Rides Fast], RossnsKAYA GAZETA 120 (977), June
29, 1994, at 3.
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E. CRIME
Although the fear of crime in Russia is somewhat exagger-
ated, it is often cited as a disincentive to foreign investment.239
The fact that crime is often commercially related in Russia adds
to this fear.240 Organized crime controls most of Russia's 2,200
banks and more than half of their capital.241 Crime is also evi-
dent in the privatization of state and municipal property.242 For
example, within the first five months of 1993, approximately
2,590 privatization-related crimes were detected. 243 One of the
reasons cited for these startling figures is that the current Crim-
inal Code lacks articles dealing with commercial crimes. 244 Ex-
isting laws have failed to alleviate crime in Russia. The
enactment of a new criminal code is expected to help solve these
problems.245 Until something is done, however, investors must
take measures to reduce the risks. The most common means to
reduce the risks of falling prey to Russia's organized crime is to
239. Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, listed three obstacles
that need to be eliminated in order to encourage U.S. capital to flow into Russia.
These obstacles included high tariffs on U.S. export commodities, the Russian
bureaucracy, and crime. Pickering noted that foreigners are often charged for
protection, and bribes are often demanded if you want procedures simplified.
U.S. Envoy Notes Obstacles to Economic Ties, Sept. 22, 1994, F.B.I.S.-Sov. 94-
184. A U.S. cigarette maker's kiosks in St. Petersburg are destroyed with hand
grenades. A small rocket destroys a U.S. company's Moscow office. A German
company loses 25 luxury automobiles from a 100-car fleet within days of receiv-
ing extortion demands. "Thugs beat, kidnap, rape or murder staff of foreign
firms. Welcome to doing business in Mother Russia." Jan H. Schut, Russian
Roulette, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, March 1995, at 26.
240. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 2.
241. Schut, supra note 239, at 26. A report by the Center of Strategic and
International Studies in Washington indicates that Russia has 5,700 criminal
groups, of which 200 are sophisticated organizations entrenched in the eco-
nomic system. Id.
242. Valeriy Nikolayev, deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry investi-
gation committee, noted that organized crime is more actively involved than
ordinary citizens in the privatization process. Internal Affairs Aide Links Priva-
tization, Crime Surge, June 30, 1993, F.B.I.S.-Sov. 93-124 [hereinafter Crime
Surge].
243. Mikhail Serdyuk, first deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry
Main Administration for Economic Crimes, asserts that these numbers are only
a small indication of the larger problem. Id. at 238.
244. Id. at 238.
245. Id. Valeriy Nikolayev, deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry in-
vestigation committee, has indicated that immediate action must be taken until
the new criminal code is drafted. "Everything in Russia will have been plun-
dered by the time the Supreme Soviet adopts a new Criminal Code and a new
Criminal Procedure Code." Id.
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hire Western security consultants. 246 Risk can be reduced by
thoroughly researching prospective business partners and
employees. 247
F. CULTURAL BARRIERS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Cultural differences between Russia and most Western na-
tions obstruct foreign investment in Russia. Russian values,
traits, and characteristics differ from those in the West. 248
These traits have developed over hundreds of years, and "aren't
easily swept aside with a coup, decree, or promise of things to
come." 249 Russian officials claim that Western business part-
ners approach a deal with a paternalistic and condescending at-
titude.250 The Russian business world is tired of hearing that
Russia does not understand the complexity of the economic situ-
ation in the West.25 1 This external attitude toward Russia can
have a drastic effect on the political stability of the country. Re-
formists in Russia assert that the nationalist and neo-fascist
forces thrive on national humiliation.252 The West must demon-
strate to the Russian public that the world needs Russia and
246. Schut, supra note 239, at 26. Johnson & Higgins, a London-based se-
curity consulting firm, conducts quarterly brainstorming sessions on crime for
clients in Russia. Id. These sessions have yielded effective loss prevention tech-
niques. For example, firms plagued by car thefts should install steering-wheel
and engine imobilizers, park in garages instead of on the street, and change the
make of their cars from imported Mercedes to locally built Ladas. Id. A large
Asian electronics company reduced theft from its warehouses by simply remov-
ing the company's brand name from the building and installing a fence and
lights. Id.
247. Id.
248. Russians are often portrayed by Westerners as pessimistic, yet resili-
ent, somewhat xenophobic, and jealous of good fortune. From a Western view-
point, some of these characteristics may seem negative. In a survival society
such as Russia, however, such characteristics are invaluable and American
traits such as optimism are not. H. Michael Mears, Structural Challenges Fac-
ing the Republics, in LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE
SovIET REPUBLICS 17 (1992).
249. Id.
250. Dialog s Zapadom huzhdayetcya b ser'yeznom pereosmyclenii [Dialogue
With the West Needs Serious Revision], KommsANT-DAInY 181, Sept. 24, 1994,
at 1 [hereinafter Dialogue With the West].
251. Id.
252. Kozyrev Insists Russia 'Not Sick Man' of Europe, Sept. 28, 1994,
F.B.I.S.-Sov. 94-188 [hereinafter Sick Man Of Europe]. Foreign Minister An-
drey Kozyrev fears that if Russia is not treated as an equal in the world market,
the humiliation will fuel nationalism and extremism. "This is why we have to
insist that any partnership with Russia be based only on the principle of equal-
ity and not on patronization-as if Russia were some historic loser that first
has to be taught how to walk." Id.
FOREIGN ZNVESTMEN7 ZN Russm
considers it a strong partner.253 Russia does not want a hand-
out in the form of financial assistance; Russia wants the oppor-
tunity to provide for itself.254
Obviously, cultural barriers are not something that can be
dealt with through legislation. The only solution for overcoming
this cultural gap is mutual respect. Foreign investors cannot go
into Russia and expect the people to change their way of life.
The foreign investor must learn about Russian culture and
business practices with an open mind. These cultural barriers
may only be overcome after years of working together. In this
respect, organizations formed to promote investment in Russia
may also promote cultural understanding. 255 Training pro-
grams provide another valuable and more economically oriented
means of overcoming cultural differences. Training provides
Russia with knowledge about market economies without the in-
sult of paternalism.256
G. POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Perhaps the most prevalent barrier to investment in Russia
is the political instability of the Russian government. Despite
its vast natural resources and an untapped consumer market,
Russia is a politically risk-prone country.257 Notwithstanding
Boris Yeltsin's assurances that Russia has achieved political
stability,258 foreign investors will not invest in Russia until they
253. Id.
254. Dialogue with the West, supra note 254, at 1. Andrey Kozyrev, the For-
eign Minister of Russia, stated: "Instead of giving a needy man a fish each day,
he should be taught how to fish. We are thankful for the technical assistance
and the experience transferred to us. But it is time the Russian fisherman was
allowed to the shores of the world ocean." Id.
255. See supra part III.
256. Recently 150 government employees of Russia flew to America for three
weeks of intensive courses in entrepreneurial schools. These new courses in
place of direct financial support will be the main area of support for the market
transformation in Russia. Aleksander Platkovskiy, Nashi Tsiplyata v Amer-
ikanskih Inkyubatorah [Our Chicks in U.S. Incubators], IZVESTIYA, Sept. 17
1994, at 3.
257. Russia is the third-highest risk country for foreign investors, following
Iraq and Nigeria. Alexander Shalnev, Pravitel'stvo Dayot Zelyoniy Svet Inos-
trannim Investitsiam [Government Gives "Green Light" to Foreign Investments],
IZVESTIYA, June 28, 1994, at 1.
258. In an attempt to attract American Investors, President Yeltsin made
the following assurances: "Yes, you were afraid of political instability, but to-
day, let me assure you, we have achieved political stability." Timothy Egan, Big
Push On Trade; Yeltsin Visits Seattle, a Good Market, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 30,
1994, at D1.
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can rely on a stable presidential government. 25 9 Given the pop-
ularity of the Nationalist party in the last election, foreign in-
vestors are concerned that their investments may be swept away
with the economic reforms of an extremist party. 260
Edict No. 1466 provides that new legislation regulating for-
eign enterprises shall not be applied for three years to enter-
prises that were in existence on the date the legislation was
enacted. 26 1 This provides a guarantee to the foreign investor
that their business will not be harmed by adverse changes in the
law, thereby reducing the risk of investment in Russia. This
protection is limited, however, to only three years. 262 Further-
more, the present Russian government has not strictly adhered
to this edict.263
Edict No. 1928 indirectly approaches the obstacle of legisla-
tive instability. It provides that the Russian government may
contribute a percentage of capital to certain investments in Rus-
sia, including foreign investments. 264 Investments taking ad-
vantage of this provision are indirectly protected from adverse
changes in legislation because the Russian government will gen-
erally be reluctant to take action which might adversely dimin-
ish its financial return on the investment.
Edict No. 2270 and the U.S.-Russia Treaty also provide pro-
tection against adverse changes in legislation. But these protec-
tions are extremely limited.265 The protections only apply to
changes in tax legislation and only affect certain enterprises. 266
259. Alexander Golts, a military observer for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, noted:
"Experience shows that foreign capital is an important lever to cure an ailing
economy. But to make it come to Russia, political stability today is not enough.
There must be a guaranteed political stability for decades to come. I am not
sure that we can give such guarantees today." Alexander Golts, Vsye dengi b
gosti budyet k nam? [All Money Will Flow To Us?], KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 148-49
(21435-36), July 2, 1994, at 2.
260. Id. at 2. Ultra-nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has spoken out
against the economic reforms in Russia: "We must come back to the past, for
Russia to be a powerful, independent, cultured and wealthy state. We do not
need any market economy for that. All processes in the state, society and econ-
omy shall be regulated." Valentin Pavlov, Zhirinovskiy Demands Halt to Mar-
ket Economy, Oct. 7, 1994, F.B.I.S.-Sov. 94-195, at 5. Zhirinovskiy is also
confident that his party will win both the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions in 1996. Id.
261. Edict No. 1466, supra note 75, at cl. 1.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 201-03.
266. Id.
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The Russian Foreign Investment Law and the Investment
Treaty provide additional guarantees against political instabil-
ity. Both provide that investments shall not be expropriated or
nationalized except for a public purpose. 267 The treaty provides
nondiscriminatory treatment toward compensation of losses in-
curred during war, revolution, a state of emergency, insurrec-
tion, and civil disturbance.268 In the event of nationalization or
expropriation, both the Foreign Investment Law and the treaty
provide for prompt, adequate and sufficient compensation. 269
Pledges by the Russian government to take responsibility for
wrongful takings indirectly insures against political instability.
A more direct insurance against political instability is provided
by Russian and American agencies that guarantee investments
in Russia. OPIC270 and the State Investment Corporation 271
were both set up to insure foreign investments against political
risks.
The fragmentation of the Russian government contributes
to its instability. Western companies often cite a lack of coordi-
nation between federal and local authorities as an obstacle to
investment in Russia. 272 The problem with this lack of coordi-
nation is that an investor does not know with whom to negotiate
or which level of government has ownership of the property.
Many companies have been forced to negotiate with local, re-
gional, and central government officials, as well as individu-
als.2 7 3 If a key level of government is left out, administrative
inquiries may call the legality of the entire venture into ques-
tion.2 7 4 This uncertainty has forced many American companies
to abandon their ventures in Russia.275
Presidential Edict No. 1466 partially addresses government
fragmentation. It provides that only the federal government can
267. See supra text accompanying notes 25 & 117.
268. See supra text accompanying note 121.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 26 & 117.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
272. American companies which serve on the Consultative Council on For-
eign Investment listed fragmentation of government as an obstacle to invest-
ment. Chernomyrdin On Foreign Investment Prospects, July 20, 1994, F.B.I.S.-
Sov. 94-139, at 15.
273. Chamber of Commerce memo, supra note 22, at 3.
274. Id.
275. The Weyerhaeuser Company, the World's largest timber company, put
its operation in Russia on hold after facing several problems related to owner-
ship of resources. A Weyerhaeuser spokesman stated: "it's a real tough place to
do business. The question is: who owns the resources? Almost every time we go
back there, we're dealing with somebody new." Egan, supra note 262, at D1.
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restrict foreign investments. All other legislation enacted by
political subdivisions that restrict foreign investments are inva-
lid.276 Although this provides certainty as to which government
regulation applies when federal and local regulations conflict, it
does nothing to solve the questions of ownership and authority
in an area devoid of legislation.
Legislative assurances about political and legislative stabil-
ity in Russia appear to have done little to ease the concerns of
foreign investors. The fact that nothing prevents the Russian
government from invalidating these assurances is a source of
continuing concern. Much beneficial legislation has been issued
in the form of presidential edicts.277 Foreign investors fear that
if a presidential edict can grant a guarantee, another can
quickly rescind it. One American investor compared the actions
of the Russian government to that of "a drunken sailor," who
alters taxes, customs and investment rules without consistency
or clear instructions to officials, and only furthers corruption
and inefficiency. 278
V. CONCLUSION
Caution is the watchword for investing in Russia. The un-
stable Russian economy still lacks the essential institutions and
traditions of a developed capitalist society. Among these risks,
however, are signs of promise. Progress has been made in ac-
commodating foreign investors by assuring them that govern-
ment action will not arbitrarily affect their investments. Some
progress toward enacting a comprehensive legal structure for
regulating commercial transactions is being made. Ambiguities,
inconsistencies, and conflicts, however, are still evident.
History demonstrates that Western political and economical
ideologies achieve uncertain success in Russia. While one re-
gime accepts the Western ideology, a succeeding regime may
transform the country overnight. It is critical, therefore, that
foreign investors in Russia exercise caution when undertaking
business ventures in reliance on new legislation. A close analy-
sis of most legislation will show that, in practice, it does not pro-
vide the extent of protection it purports to provide. The law has
only begun to overcome the barriers to foreign investment in
Russia. Obstacles remain in privatization, taxation, political in-
276. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
278. Steven Erlanger, Russia Lurches Further Along the Capitalist Road,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1994, at A3.
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stability, infrastructure, crime and cultural differences. Fur-
thermore, the protections that the law affords can be taken away
as easily as they were granted.
There are risks involved in undertaking an investment in
Russia. Those foreign companies that take the challenge, how-
ever, may reap rich rewards. Such companies must be coura-
geous, patient and well prepared. There will rarely be short
term rewards. Thus investors should approach the Russian
economy with a long-term strategy that will secure a place in the
Russian marketplace of the future.

